With rebels to the east and foreign miners to the south, the DRC makes quite some headlines in recent years. While the mentioned areas of interest catch the public eye, other activities concerning the central African giant are less frequently talked about, such as the Belgrade summit hosted by Serbia’s president on the 29th November 2025.
What interests does the DRC have in Serbia and why is the conference happening now? Are we talking about a completely new partnership or about strengthening already established ties?
The link between Serbia and the DRC
First of all, historically speaking both Serbia and the DRC are on friendly terms since the early 1960s at a time where the latter became independent as Serbia strongly supported the anti colonial narrative.
Amidst the strategic mapping of the political landscape during the cold war period, both countries were key actors for the foundation of the nonalignment movement to establish a third position on the bipolar world politics stage.
After the collapse of former Yugoslavia which led to the fragmentation into a controversial conglomerate of new nation states, Serbia has a particularly difficult relationship with its southern neighbor Kosovo, which declared its independence in 2008.
In favor of beneficial relations with its Balkan partner, the DRC has also not recognized Kosovo as a sovereign state thus supporting the narrative of anti-fragmentism and national unity; a statement which directly relates to the current question on the Eastern DRC and the M23.
Results of the bilateral Belgrade Conference 2025
Considering the political situation the Tshisekedi administration finds itself in today with a superficial peace treaty brokered by the United States as well as the EU’s slow bureaucratic response to sanctioning Rwanda, strengthening ties to external state actors makes absolute sense.
As a result, the bilateral conference brought forth one letter of intent followed by three memorandums of understanding emphasizing on diplomacy, regular political consultations and sports.
Furthermore, other official statements hint possible further discussion on military cooperation, which has already been rudimentarily outlined in a bilateral military agreement from the 30th of October 2023.
Why now?
Timing is a crucial element statespersons should master and can be the make or break in decision-making processes.
As of 2025, the conversation on the Eastern DRC conflict between the Congolese government and the M23 armed group gained great prominence on the global political scene reinforced by the United States’ diplomatic intervention.
Even though symbolic, the European Union positions itself more towards the side of Kinshasa, publicly condemning Rwanda based on NGO reports such as by the UN and Amnesty International, justifying the introduction of sanctions into the conversation of EU politics.
One example where this European moral approach proofed effective is the famous football club FC Bayern München’s decision made on 8thof August 2025 to cancel their “Visit Rwanda” sponsorship, which was negotiated to be a 5-year long term investment.
In this context it makes both for Tshisekedi and his Serbian counterpart Vučić sense to collaborate, as the Congolese have the narrative of being attacked by Rwanda leading to a necessity to defend themselves while Serbia positions itself as a uncomplicated unitary collaborator in questions of economic and possibly also military partnership.
The benefits are firstly a cheaper cost for weaponry for the Congolese, since U.S. arms and EU customs on critical minerals make foreign arms purchases comparatively expensive.
Furthermore, Serbia is a unilateral actor not bound by the EU and can therefore provide what the DRC needs without lengthy bureaucratic hurdles or discussions about ethical aspects of weapon sales.
Additionally, this bilateral cooperation might be hailed by Tshisekedi as an effort for peace and national sovereignty, which might frame Vučić as a defender for democracy; an image that might be supportive for a possible EU integration.
On the other hand, forging alliances abroad instead of with their own neighboring country, with which it has most recently signed a peace agreement shows how effective and esteemed this “peace agreement” actually is.
It indeed shows that Kinshasa and Kigali are still far away from a relationship based on mutual trust and amicability.
While these developments seem to be a reasonable example of South-South cooperations, it is not unlikely that Serbia might have further economic interest regrading the DRC’s mineral wealth, even though it has not been officially discussed broadly.
In other words, this cooperation should be observed with caution and requires more in-depth research in how far Serbian interests might be new soil for repeated (Eastern) European exploitation of resources and enrichment on the cost of Africans.
